(Ctools) Ostrom, Elinor, “Huerta Irrigation” pp. 69-76, Governing the Commons
- huerta
- well-demarked irrigation area surrounding nearby towns
- syndic
- chief executive of a single (one of the 7 major canals) irrigation community
- tribunal
- water court, with Islamic roots
- ditch-rider
- guards that help syndic enforce regulations
- executive committee
- (replaced "inspectors" who, in medieval times, assisted with physical punishments) farmers elected to consult with syndic, maintenance decisions, watchdog
- turno system
- order in which irrigators receive water is fixed, each farmer decides how much water to take, as long as it's not wasted
Environment has always made for limited water, long-term institution for regulating it:
- Turia River divided into 8 canals serving 16,000-hectare huerta
- Formal regulations created 1435
- Rules there before Valencia retaken from Muslims 1238
- 1,000 years total
- Variation in flow high, until Generalisimo Dam constrtucted 1951
Rules of Institution
- Rights to irrigated water decided by type of land: some land has always been irrigated (regadiu), so the right to water is inherent in it; other land is "dry" (secu) and not entitled to water; some land only gets water when it is abundant (extremales)
- Valencia: land entitled to canal water in proportion to its size
Two tribunal meetings:
1) to judge individual irrigators, assess fines, etc.
Excludes local syndic, other syndics decide on case
Enforces operational rules
2) to coordinate intercanal problems, institutional procedures
Creates operational rules at the cooperative-level
Three conditions of water availability:
1. abundance - farmers can take as much water as they need - rare condition
2. seasonal low water - canals get water on a rotational basis, irrigators get water in their turn - most frequent condition
3. extraordinary drought - farmers expected to take less, farmers whose crops are in most need get the water,
as drought worsens, syndic and representatives take more responsibility for regulating
Monitoring and enforcement
- farmers can see the irrigator ahead of him in line
- multiple groups watch each other
- high enforcement levels to dampen temptation to steal
- fines are low and variable, based on seriousness of offense, economic conditions, offender's ability to pay
- first-time fines are lower than those for repeat-offenders
Success of regime
- Actual violence never reached potential violence
- Conformance rate was high
- Most infractions were one-time offenses (2/3), and of the repeaters, those involved in 2 offenses were greater than those involved in 3, etc.
- Antagonism by enforcers and fellow farmers was rare
